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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from Mr. Jorge Tinoco's judgment of conviction and sentences for

trafficking in methamphetamine and delivery of a controlled substance.

B.

Factual Summary and General Course of Proceedings
According to the State, in February 2011, an undercover officer called Mr. Tinoco and

asked him to obtain two pounds of methamphetamine. Tr. Vol. 6, p. 23, In. 2 - p. 24, In. 25; p.
63, In. 11-24. The transaction fell through and in March, Mr. Tinoco allegedly told the
undercover officer that he would call when he had some available. Id at p. 26, In. 13 - p 28, In.
20. In mid-March, the undercover officer indicated that Mr. Tinoco informed him there were
three pounds of methamphetamine available. Id. at p. 31, In. 21 - p. 33, In. 6; p. 194, In. 9 - p.
196, In. 25. Mr. Tinoco allegedly traveled to Idaho with his brother Rodolfo Ferreira.
According to the undercover officer, he and Mr. Tinoco agreed to meet at a local truckstop after Mr. Tinoco arrived. Id at p. 35, In. 16 - p. 36, In. 25. At the truck-stop, the
undercover officer entered a vehicle with Mr. Tinoco and his nephew Omar and Mr. Tinoco
allegedly gave the undercover officer a small amount of methamphetamine. Id. at p. 40, In. 12 p. 44, In. 13. The undercover officer agreed to come to Omar's apartments to purchase the larger
quantity of methamphetamine. Id. at p. 45, In. 8-12. Law enforcement obtained a search warrant
for Omar's apartments and found approximately three pounds of methamphetamine in a storage
shed. Id. at p. 81, In. 7-17; p. 86, In. 16 - p. 89, In. 8. Police also discovered that the passenger
air-bag in the vehicle that Mr. Tinoco drove from California had been removed such that the area
could be used as a storage compartment. Id. at p. 129, In. 1 - p. 130, In. 3.
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Mr. Tinoco was arrested and charged via complaint with trafficking in more than 400
grams of methamphetamine and delivery of a controlled substance. C.R. Vol. 1, p. 8-11. Mr.
Ferreira was charged in a different case. See id. at p. 36-38. Mr. Tinoco was unable to post the
$500,000 bond. See ROA; C.R. p. 62, 78. On April 7, 2011, the State filed an indictment
charging Mr. Tinoco with the same offenses. C.R. Vol. 1, p. 16-17. Mr. Tinoco pied not guilty
and asserted his right to speedy trial on April 15, 2011. C.R. p. 24-25. Trial was initially
scheduled for July 6, 2011 and was re-scheduled for August 16, 2011, because the grand jury
transcript had not yet been prepared. Id. at p. 30-31.
The day following the pre-trial conference, on July 26, 2011, the State finally moved to
consolidate Mr. Tinoco's case with Mr. Ferreira's. C.R. Vol. 1, p. 36-37. Mr. Ferreira objected
to the consolidation in part because the State had unduly delayed in seeking consolidation. Tr.
Vol. 3, p. 11-13. The district court agreed that the motion to consolidate was untimely but found

Mr. Tinoco and Mr. Ferreira had sufficient notice prior to trial and granted the motion. Id. at p.
41-42. On August 8, 2011, Mr. Ferreira moved to sever his trial from Mr. Tinoco's, which the
district court denied. C.R. Vol. 1, p. 48-49, p. 66-73.
On September 20, 2011, during the course of jury selection, Mr. Tinoco noted the State
improperly used its peremptory challenges to strike the majority of Hispanic jurors. C.R. Vol. 1,
p. 98-112. Prior to the jury being seated and sworn, both defense counsel informed the district
court of the Batson violation and counsel understood the district court indicated that it would
hear argument on the challenge later in the day after the jury had been seated. C.R. Vol. 1, p.
103, 111-12. The jury was then sworn and the district court later ruled that the Batson challenge
was waived because Mr. Tinoco did not raise the issue prior to the jury being sworn. Id. at p. 952

96. However, the district court acknowledged that the in-chambers discussion could have misled
counsel and that a mistrial was appropriate. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 32, In. 12-17. The trial was then re-set
for November 1, 2011, which was eighteen days beyond the speedy trial period.
Mr. Tinoco moved to dismiss because the delay of his trial beyond October 12, 2011
violated his rights to a speedy trial under I.C. § 19-350land the Idaho and United States
Constitutions. C.R. Vol. 1, p. 129-131. Mr. Tinoco noted that the delay in his case was initially
created by the State's decision to wait until July to seek to join the cases. Id. at p. 132. The case
was further delayed by the State's suspect use of peremptory challenges to exclude Hispanics
from the jury and the district court's erroneous insistence that the jury be seated and sworn prior
to taking up the Batson challenge. Id. Because the reason for the delay was not compelling,
dismissal was warranted even though the trial was only delayed eighteen days beyond the speedy
trial time period. Id. at p. 131-33. Mr. Tinoco also noted that he had been continuously
incarcerated and was prejudiced by the delay because the State obtained fingerprint evidence
following the mistrial suggesting he had handled the packaging in which the methamphetamine
in the storage shed was found. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 23, In. 5-23.
The district court found that the delay outside the speedy trial period was due to the
district court's error in creating confusion regarding the Batson issue, which necessitated the
mistrial. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 31, In. 22 - p. 32, In. 11. However, the district court denied the motion,
finding that the case was brought to trial in a timely fashion and then "simply reset for trial after
the mistrial." Id. at p. 36, In. 5-10. The district court further found that the district court's error
constituted good cause for the delay, that Mr. Tinoco joined the motion for the mistrial to ensure
he had a fair trial, that the delay was short and that prejudice has been minimal. Id. at p. 36, In.
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12-23.
Mr. Tinoco was found guilty following trial. C.R. Vol. 2, p. 187-89. The district court
sentenced Mr. Tinoco to a unified term of twenty-three years with a minimum period of
confinement of ten years for trafficking and a concurrent term of fifteen years with a minimum
period of confinement of ten years for delivery. Id. at p. 228-29. This appeal follows.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Tinoco's motion to dismiss because the delay in
bringing him to trial violated the speedy trial guarantee protected by I.C. § 19-3501, the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution?

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Tinoco's Motion to Dismiss Because the
Delay in Bringing Him to Trial Violated His Speedy Trial Rights
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the

Idaho Constitution guarantee a speedy trial. These constitutional rights are supplemented by
Idaho statute which provides that the "court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must
order the ... indictment to be dismissed ... if a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed
upon his application, is not brought to trial within [six months] from the date that the defendant
was arraigned." LC.§ 19-3501(3) (emphasis added). Whether there was an infringement of a
defendant's right to a speedy trial presents a mixed question oflaw and fact. State v. Clark, 135
Idaho 255,257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000). Thus, this Court defers to the trial court's findings of
fact if supported by substantial and competent evidence while exercising free review of the trial
court's conclusions oflaw. Id.
The reason for the delay lies at the heart of a good cause determination under LC. §
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19-3501 and the State bears the burden to demonstrate good cause for a failure to bring a
defendant to trial within the six-month limit. Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936; State v.

Livas, 147 Idaho 547, 549, 211 P.3d 792, 794 (Ct. App. 2009). "Good cause" means that there
was a substantial reason for the delay that rises to the level of a legal excuse. State v. Young, 136
Idaho 113, 116, 29 P.3d 949,952 (2001); Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936.
Although the analysis should focus upon the reason for the delay, the reason cannot be
evaluated entirely in a vacuum and a good cause determination may take into account the
additional factors listed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). See Clark, 135 Idaho at
260, 16 P.3d at 936. Thus, when they bear on the sufficiency or strength of the reason for the
delay, a court may also consider (1) the length of the delay; (2) whether the defendant asserted
the right to a speedy trial; and (3) the prejudice to the defendant.

Id. at 380,283 P.3d 124,283 P.3d at 127.
Nevertheless, if the reason for the delay is insufficient, the other factors will not avail to
avoid dismissal. Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936; State v. Jacobson, 153 Idaho 377,380,
283 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct. App. 2012). "Where the reason for the delay is well defined, and that
reason on its face clearly does, or clearly does not, constitute good cause, there is no occasion to
consider the other Barker factors in assessing a claimed violation of Idaho Code § 19-3501.

Jacobson, 153 Idaho at 380,283 P.3d at 127. Thus, courts only resort to the other Barker factors
"in close cases as where, for example, there are multiple reasons for the delay attributable to both
the State and the defendant or the sufficiency of the reason to constitute 'good cause' is
genuinely subject to disagreement." Jacobson, 153 Idaho at 380, 283 P.3d at 127.
Here, Mr. Tinoco's trial was delayed beyond the speedy trial time period because the
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district court misled counsel as to when the Batson challenge could be heard, which ultimately
required the district court to declare a mistrial. Because there was no good cause for the delay,
the district court erred in denying Mr. Tinoco' s motion to dismiss regardless of the length of the
delay and prejudice. Even if the reason for the delay was sufficient to warrant consideration of
the Barker factors, that reason and the prejudice to Mr. Tinoco cannot justify even the eighteen
day delay in this case. Accordingly, this Court should reverse Mr. Tinoco' s judgment of
conviction and sentences and remand this case with instruction to grant the motion to dismiss.
1.

The reason for the delay

The prosecution and the trial court have the primary burden to ensure that cases are
brought to trial in a timely manner. Barker, 407 U.S. at 529; Jacobson, 153 Idaho at 380,283
P.3d at 127. In Jacobson, the trial court incorrectly determined the deadline for a trial date
within the speedy trial time frame. The Court reasoned that if, "as our Supreme Court held in
Clark, a trial court's overcrowded trial calendar does not constitute good cause, then the mistake
that occurred here, which might properly be characterized as negligence, cannot amount to good
cause justifying the delay of a defendant's trial beyond the Idaho Code§ 19-3501 time limit."
Jacobson, 153 Idaho at 380,283 P.3d at 127. The Court further concluded that the absence of
good cause warranted dismissal without considering other factors because "an utter absence of
good cause cannot be 'outweighed' by other Barker factors." Id
Mr. Tinoco's trial was delayed:
because of an issue arising from [the] Court's communication, and perhaps
misleading to the attorneys off the record as to taking up the Batson challenge,
and then recommencing the trial without addressing the Batson challenge. There
was sufficient error on the record at the time the motion for mistrial was raised by
the defendants ... [and] the Court accepted responsibility for the mistrial. That is
the reason for the delay. I do not find it was delay caused by the State or Defense
6

in this case, but, in fact, the Court.
Tr. Vol. 5, p. 31, In. 24 - p. 32, In. 11.
If a congested calendar or miscalculating the speedy trial period cannot be good cause,

than the district court's error in misleading counsel regarding the timing of the Batson challenge
does not justify setting the trial outside the speedy trial period. Although the district court's
conduct was unintentional, negligence is not automatically tolerable simply because the accused
cannot demonstrate exactly how it has prejudiced him or her. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S .
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647, 657 (1992). Because there was no good cause for the delay, the district court erred in
denying the motion to dismiss regardless of whether the additional Barker factors also weigh
towards dismissal.
2.

Mr. Tinoco asserted his right to a speedy trial

Neither the parties nor the Court indicated on the record at the time the mistrial was
granted that the new trial date was outside the speedy trial period. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 27, In. 6-11.
Nonetheless, the prosecution and the trial court bear the duty to timely bring a defendant to trial.
Jacobson, 153 Idaho at 380 n.2, 283 P.3d at 127, n.2; State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349,354, 160

P.3d 1284, 1289 (Ct. App. 2007).
Further, Mr. Tinoco does not bear the responsibility for the previous delays in his case.
The trial was initially reset as a result of the State's inexplicit decision to wait until the eve of
trial to seek to consolidate his case with Mr. Ferreira's and Mr. Ferreira's challenges to that
consolidation. Accordingly, as found by the district court, Mr. Tinoco "stood on his speedy trial
rights" throughout the proceedings." Tr. Vol. 5, p. 33, In. 18-21.
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3.

Prejudice to Mr. Tinoco and the length of the delay

Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests that the right to a speedy trial is
designed to protect: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Young,
136 Idaho at 118, 29 P.3d at 954. Prejudice is the most significant because a hindrance to
adequate preparation of the defense skews the fairness of the entire system. Barker, 407 U.S. at
532;.
Here, Mr. Tinoco was continuously incarcerated and undoubtedly suffered much anxiety
and concern while awaiting trial. Additionally, fingerprint evidence implicating Mr. Tinoco
became available after the speedy trial period. Under some circumstances, courts attach great
weight to considerations such as the state's need for time to collect evidence. See Barker, 407
U.S. at 531. In this situation however, the State had been prepared to go to trial without this
evidence and, thus, it must not have been able to sufficiently justify the laboratory's delay to
warrant continuing the case outside of the speedy trial period. Because the district court's error
resulted in a continuance, the State was granted a windfall in gaining additional time to put its
case together.
4.

Conclusion

Mr. Tinoco's trial was delayed outside the speedy trial period because of the district
court's error. Because the reason for the delay cannot constitute "good cause," the case should
have been dismissed without resorting to analysis of the other Barker factors. Even when those
factors are considered, the circumstances demonstrate that Mr. Tinoco's right to speedy trial was
violated and that the case should have been dismissed.
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V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Tinoco respectfully asks that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
sentences and remand for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this

Jl_ day of Feb
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